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The Integrity of Financial Analysts: Evidence from Asymmetric
Responses to Earnings Surprises

Abstract
This paper investigates the integrity of financial analysts by examining their
recommendation responses to large quarterly earnings surprises. Although there is no
significant difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated
analysts in response to positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are more reluctant
than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade stock recommendations in response to negative
earnings surprises. The evidence implies that conflicts of interest undermine the integrity
of financial analysts. We further examine the effects of reputation concern and the Global
Research Analyst Settlement as informal and formal mechanisms, on restoring analysts’
integrity. The results show that the positive bias in recommendations remains prevalent
for affiliated analysts from reputable investment banks and for the post-reform period.
Finally, evidence from market reactions suggests that investors fail to notice that
analysts’ integrity is compromised by conflicts of interest and are misled by affiliated
analysts.

JEL classification: G10, G24, G02
Keywords: Integrity, analysts’ response, conflicts of interest, earnings surprises

1. Introduction
Financial analysts provide professional expertise and communication channels for
both managers and investors. Their role in protecting investors and ensuring investor
well-being in capital markets has received increasing attention from investors, regulators,
and researchers. As important participants in the stock market, analysts collect and
analyze firm financial information and other publicly available information, forecast
revenues and earnings, and issue stock recommendations. The information and
recommendations contained in analyst reports help investors to identify investment
opportunities and risks. Previous studies have generally concluded that analysts provide
valuable information that enhances market efficiency (e.g., Schipper, 1991; Brown,
2000). They also serve as whistleblowers on corporate fraud, accounting for 16.9% of
fraud detection (Dyck et al., 2010), and deter managers from engaging in opportunistic
behavior, thereby decreasing earnings management, corporate fraud, and the modification
of audit opinions (Yu, 2008; Chen et al., 2014 and 2015ab).
However, a number of studies have raised concerns about the integrity of
financial analysts in capital markets. Jensen (2011) defines analysts with integrity as
those who keep their word, i.e., honor their commitments and fulfil their promises on
time, and who are honest and straightforward. Using data collected by a mail survey of
security analysts, Veit and Murphy (1996) document that approximately 25% of the
analysts in the sample had experienced or observed unethical behavior by a colleague,
such as a lack of diligence and thoroughness in making recommendations, or writing
reports with predetermined conclusions. Cote and Goodstein (1999) question the ethics of
analysts’ practice of withholding their private opinions, and argue that analysts’ herding
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behavior has long-term ramifications for the efficient pricing of securities and the
preservation of public trust in the financial services industry. Other studies show that
conflicts of interest reduce analysts’ integrity, as reflected in biased recommendations
(Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; O’Brien et al., 2005; Palazzo
and Rethel, 2008; Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008; Wu et al., 2015). In the Financial
Market Integrity Outlook Survey conducted by the CFA Institute in 2011, financial
advisors in the global markets received a score of only 3 out of a possible 5 for integrity.
Financial advisory services are considered to have the most serious ethical issues.1
The aim of this study is to shed further light on the topical yet under-researched
issue of the integrity of financial analysts by taking earnings surprises into account to
investigate how conflicts of interest determine analysts’ recommendation responses. We
also examine the effectiveness of informal (reputation concern) and formal mechanisms
(the Global Research Analyst Settlement of 2003, hereafter the Global Settlement) in
restoring their integrity, and explore whether the market recognizes the systematic bias
caused by the reduced integrity of financial analysts.
Conflicts of interest may arise when sell-side analysts, who are employed by
investment banks or brokerage firms, 2 are under pressure from their employers (i.e.,
investment banks) to produce favorable research reports either to maintain relationships
with current investment banking clients or to attract such clients. Underwriting equity or
bond offerings is an important revenue source for investment banks, and optimistic
reports may encourage clients to buy securities and increase brokerage commissions (e.g.,
1

Source:
the
CFA
Institute
Financial
Market
Integrity
Outlook
Survey
(http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/topics/Pages/financial_market_integrity_index.aspx).
2
In contrast, buy-side analysts are employed by pension-fund or mutual-fund companies and manage
money on behalf of their clients. These analysts research stocks and make recommendations to the funds’
financial managers. Conflicts of interest are generally of less concern among buy-side analysts.
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Cowen et al., 2006). Analysts also have an incentive to maintain good relationships with
the managers of the firms they follow, as management provides an important information
source (e.g., Francis et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998). Analysts employed by a merger and
acquisition (M&A) advisor also tend to make optimistic recommendation revisions over a
180-day period surrounding the M&A announcement (e.g. Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008;
Wu et al., 2015). Sell-side analysts, regarded as affiliated analysts, are subject to more
conflicts of interest than unaffiliated analysts whose employers have no investment
banking relationships with the firms they follow.
We extend the studies of analyst optimism by focusing on analysts’ responses to
earnings surprises, which represent important new information released to the market.3
We argue that conflicts of interest may impede affiliated analysts from incorporating
negative earnings surprises in their recommendations. Large negative earnings surprises
usually indicate a firm’s unexpected financial deterioration, and are a red flag to
investors, alerting observant analysts to the need to revise their earnings forecasts and
recommendations (Brown and Rozzeff, 1979; Stickel, 1989). 4 A set of firms with
earnings surprises thus provides an interesting context in which to investigate analysts’
recommendation changes and any possible bias involved in these changes. While large
positive earnings surprises represent good news for the market and for both affiliated and
3

Prior studies report that large earnings surprises, particularly large negative earnings surprises, are costly
to firms (e.g., Mikhail et al., 2004; Doyle et al., 2006; Ng, 2007). Managers are thus motivated to avoid
large negative earnings surprises and report earnings that are consistent with market expectations (e.g.,
Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002). Firms facing large negative earnings surprises are also
more likely to make discretionary disclosures to warn investors about disappointing earnings (Kasznik and
Lev, 1995).
4
In comparison with earnings that meet or marginally exceed analysts’ expectations, which many
researchers interpret as the outcome of earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Hayn,
1995), large positive earnings surprises are less likely to be the result of managers’ earnings manipulation.
Likewise, large negative earnings surprises are less likely to be the result of firms’ use of the “big bath”
technique. Large negative earnings surprises may be interpreted as an indication of a firm’s financial
distress because it is relatively difficult for management to boost earnings through earnings management to
an extent that they can substantially meet analysts’ earnings expectations.
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unaffiliated analysts, large negative earnings surprises make conflicts of interest more
severe for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts.
In the absence of conflicts of interest, we expect to observe a symmetric pattern in
the recommendation changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following both
positive and negative earnings surprises. However, when conflicts of interest deteriorate
integrity, the responses of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to large positive and
negative earnings surprises are expected to be asymmetric. More specifically, we do not
expect to observe any significant difference in recommendation changes between
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following large positive earnings surprises, whereas
following large negative earnings surprises, affiliated analysts with conflicts of interest
are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade their stock recommendations.
We analyze 52,862 firm-quarter-analyst observations from the 1994 to 2005
period on 7,568 large quarterly earnings surprises (4,591 positive and 2,977 negative)
reported by firms publicly listed in the U.S. The results confirm our expectations. We
find that in response to large positive earnings surprises, there is no significant difference
in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts – they both
upgrade their stock recommendations in a similar way to reflect the favorable information
content of large positive earnings surprises. In response to large negative earnings
surprises, however, affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to
downgrade

stocks.

The

reluctance

of

affiliated

analysts

to

issue

negative

recommendations (in the form of stock downgrades) to investment banking clients
provides evidence of the violation of integrity when conflicts of interest occur.
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We proceed to examine whether informal and formal disciplinary mechanisms
can be used to enhance the integrity of financial analysts. As a good reputation in capital
markets can provide financial intermediaries with benefits such as perceived credibility
and trustworthiness, which are critical to their success in attracting clients, we argue that
reputation

concern

may

be

an

informal

mechanism

motivating

unbiased

recommendations. More prestigious investment banks have greater reputation concern as
they have more to lose, are more visible in the market, and are thus subject to more
public scrutiny. Therefore, we attempt to determine whether patterns of responses to
positive and negative earnings surprises are different among analysts from prestigious
investment banks. The results show that analysts at prestigious investment banks do not
behave differently from analysts at less prestigious banks, implying that reputation
concern fails to enhance integrity by promoting independent and unbiased
recommendations. This is in line with Fang and Yasuda’s (2009) finding that a bank’s
reputation concern does not offset the effects of conflicts of interest.
The formal mechanism for restoring analysts’ integrity examined in this study is
the Global Settlement. Aimed to mitigate analysts’ conflicts of interest, this reform
explicitly prohibits the tying of analysts’ compensation to investment banking business,
and requires investment banks to prevent internal communication and interaction that
could lead to conflicts of interest by separating their securities underwriting departments
from their stock research departments using “Chinese walls” or other information
barriers. 5 We attempt to determine whether the Global Settlement reduces analysts’
conflicts of interest and encourages analysts to issue unbiased recommendations. Our

5

See the news release by the Securities
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
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and

Exchange

Commission

(SEC)

at

results show that the positive bias in recommendations remains prevalent after the
introduction of the Global Settlement. In line with Boni’s (2005) finding that regulatory
reform is incapable of eliminating positively biased recommendations, our results enrich
the studies of the Global Settlement. Wu et al. (2015) document that the benefits of the
reform is only limited to the reduction of optimism estimated over a 180-day period
surrounding the M&A announcement. When the optimism is estimated in the 90-day
period prior to the announcement, the impact is no longer effective. It is worth noting that
biased recommendation during this period is more likely to mislead investors because the
market has not yet known whether the analyst’s brokerage had won an advisory contract
with the “to be announced” acquirer. Likewise, Boni and Womack (2003) suggest that
although the new rules encourage more independent research, financial analysts may still
be under pressure to issue positively biased reports to retain their relationships with the
managers of client firms.6
Finally, we examine the extent to which investors are aware of the compromised
integrity posed by conflicts of interest by examining the market reactions to
recommendation changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. As affiliated
analysts are more likely to be biased, investors should regard unaffiliated analysts as
more credible (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). However, the
results show that investors do not react differently to recommendation changes issued by

6

According to The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 11, 2014), Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and eight other
investment banks were collectively fined $43.5 million by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in
2014. The banks were accused of offering favorable stock research reports to attract underwriting business
in an initial public offering by Toys ’R’ Us. This case suggests that conflicts of interest remain to be an
issue for some investment banks.
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affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, suggesting that investors fail to recognize integrity
risks and are misled by positively biased recommendations made by affiliated analysts.
This study contributes to the literature in various ways. First, we extend the
literature on the integrity of financial analysts by examining whether they adjust their
recommendations when firm earnings are inconsistent with their predictions. While the
literature focuses on recommendation optimism in general without taking earnings
surprises into account, we examine analysts’ reactions when they are proved wrong, a
circumstance in which analysts’ conflicts of interest become a salient issue. We provide
original evidence of the positively biased changes in recommendations made by sell-side
analysts in response to large quarterly earnings surprises. The results indicate that
analysts’ private interests may take precedence over their obligation to provide accurate
recommendations i.e., conflicts of interest undermines the integrity of financial analysts.7
Second, we add to the literature on the ethical implications of reputation by
examining the role of the reputation concern of investment banks in mitigating conflicts
of interest (i.e., Carter and Manaster, 1990; Fang, 2005). Our findings show that the
effectiveness of reputation as an informal disciplinary mechanism to mitigate the selfinterest of financial analysts is essentially limited.
Third, our study enriches the growing literature on the Global Settlement (i.e.,
Kadan, et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2015) by examining the extent to
which the reform promotes independent and unbiased recommendations. The findings
show that the reform has failed to restore the integrity of financial analysts, as the
recommendations made by affiliated analysts continue to be positively biased. The results
7

The CFA Institute, a global association of professional financial analysts, recently published a Code of
Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct (effective from July 1, 2014), which defines principles that
help analysts to manage their conflicts of interest.
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are broadly in line with the literature which concludes that the impact of the reform is
rather limited, at least not as effective as hoped by regulators. Further actions should be
taken and policies introduced to cultivate analysts’ moral resolution and integrity.
Investors should also be made aware of the compromise of financial analysts’ integrity as
reflected in their positively biased recommendations.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. We provide a motivating
example in the next section. In Section 3, we review the relevant literature and develop
our hypotheses. We report the data and research design in Section 4, and the empirical
results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.

2. A Motivating Example
We consider the example of New Century Financial Corporation, a subprime
mortgage lender delisted on March 13, 2007 when the price of its stocks fell to $0.67
(from $51.97 in May 2006). As illustrated in Appendix A, the firm reported a negative
earnings surprise of 41% in the third quarter of 2006, following an initial negative
surprise of 2% in the previous quarter. Despite this large earnings surprise, analysts
continued to issue optimistic recommendations. Of the 10 ratings given within the month
after the firm’s earnings surprise announcement in the third quarter of 2006, two were
“strong buy,” five were “buy,” two were “hold,” and only one was “sell.” Analysts
remained relatively optimistic about the stock until as little as one week before the
delisting; the 12 recommendations issued that week still included one “buy” rating and
seven “hold” ratings. The consensus recommendation level was 3.4 (equivalent to a
“strong hold” rating), despite a sharp decline in the firm’s stock price due to massive
publicized mortgage losses. Further examination reveals that two investment banks
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underwrote the firm’s securities issuances by $100 million in 2006. None of the analysts
from these investment banks issued a “sell” rating for the stock.8
This example clearly shows how analysts’ responses to a firm’s earnings surprises
may be compromised by incentives related to maintaining or creating underwriting
relationships—perhaps to generate more revenue by underwriting a firm’s securities in
the future.9 The example motivates us to examine analysts’ responses to important news
events—namely large earnings surprises—when updating their stock recommendations in
the presence of conflicts of interest.

3. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses
3.1. Analyst recommendations and positive earnings surprises
Financial analysts respond promptly to new information, and their stock reports
and information dissemination promote market efficiency by helping investors to more
accurately value companies (Schipper, 1991; Brown, 2000). Brown and Rozzeff (1979)
find that analysts revise their forecasts in response to new information by decreasing
(increasing) their quarterly earnings forecasts in response to previous high (low)
predictions. Stickel (1989) reports that revisions increase following earnings
announcements because analysts reevaluate a firm’s stock after new earnings information
is published. Large earnings surprises represent important information. Analysts are
expected by both investment banks and investors to update their valuations subsequent to
quarterly earnings announcements to help investors to process the new information.

We collected analysts’ recommendation ratings and earnings surprises from Yahoo! Finance
(http://finance.yahoo.com). The information on the firm’s securities issuance was drawn from its 2006 10Q
form.
9
Responses may also be compromised merely by analysts’ ignorance or lack of research. We indirectly
investigate these possibilities by adding analyst experience as a control variable in our regression analysis.
8
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Large positive earnings surprises represent good news for the market and for both
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, and do not induce conflicts of interest. As a result, we
expect to observe similar pattern of changes in the recommendations of affiliated and
unaffiliated analysts following large positive earnings surprises. That is, both affiliated
and unaffiliated analysts are expected to upgrade their recommendations in the same way
to reflect the favorite information content of large positive earnings surprises. We
develop our first hypothesis as follows.
H1: There is no significant difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’
responses to positive earnings surprises.
3.2. Analyst recommendations and negative earnings surprises
When firms report large negative earnings surprises, conflicts of interest become
more pronounced for affiliated analysts, because unfavorable changes to their stock
recommendations may reduce commissions and harm their business relationships with
investment banking clients. Large negative earnings surprises therefore induce more
conflicts of interest for affiliated analysts than unaffiliated analysts, as the latter are more
independent.
Although sell-side analysts are professionally obliged to make downward forecast
revisions and downgrade stocks to maintain forecast accuracy in response to negative
surprises, pressure from investment banks to write favorable reports to maintain or create
underwriting relationships may take precedence over their integrity, leading to a positive
bias in the earnings forecasts and stock recommendations made by affiliated financial
analysts. Therefore, we expect to observe differences in the patterns of recommendation
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changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts in response to large negative
earnings surprises, as stated in our second hypothesis below.
H2: Affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade
stock recommendations subsequent to negative earnings surprises.
3.3. Financial analysts and reputation concern
Reputation is a critical source of material benefits for investment banks. Studies
of the relation between investment banks’ reputation and performance in initial public
offerings (IPOs) show that the IPOs contracted by more prestigious underwriters are
associated with short-term (e.g., Logue, 1973; Tinic, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 1990)
and long-term (Carter et al., 1998) outperformance. Similar findings are reported for the
bond market. Fang (2005) shows that prestigious banks obtain lower bond yields and
charge higher fees. Kim et al. (2005) show that clients are willing to pay higher loan rates
to borrow from banks with better reputations. As a result, investment banks—especially
prestigious banks, which are under great public scrutiny—have strong incentives to build
and protect their reputation as financial intermediaries. Biased recommendations from
financial analysts at prestigious investment banks could mislead investors and jeopardize
the banks’ perceived credibility and trustworthiness. Therefore, we regard reputation as
an informal mechanism for enhancing the integrity of financial analysts and expect
reputation concern to motivate investment banks to encourage their analysts to engage in
independent and high-quality stock research, thereby mitigating analysts’ conflicts of
interest. We propose the following hypothesis in relation to reputation.
H3: The asymmetric responses of affiliated financial analysts are mitigated by
reputation concern.
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3.4. Financial analysts and regulatory reform
The Global Settlement was an enforcement agreement reached in 2003 by the
SEC, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), the New York State Attorney General’s Office, and 10 of the largest
investment banks in the US. The main purpose of the agreement was to reduce analysts’
conflicts of interest and enhance their integrity. Together with Rule 2711, previously
issued by the NASD, and the NYSE’s amended Rule 472, the Global Settlement
explicitly prohibits the tying of analysts’ compensation to investment banking business,
and requires every investment bank to prevent internal communication and interaction
that could lead to conflicts of interest by separating its underwriting department from its
stock-analysis department with a “Chinese wall” or other information barrier.
Several recent studies have investigated the effects of the Global Settlement on
the research conducted by sell-side analysts, but their results are not conclusive. Kadan et
al. (2009) find that optimistic recommendations have been less frequent and more
informative since the regulations, and pessimistic or neutral recommendations have been
more frequent and less informative. Clarke et al. (2009) report that since the Global
Settlement, both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts have been less likely to issue “strong
buy” recommendations. However, Boni (2005) reports that analysts have been even more
optimistic since the Global Settlement, providing evidence that the number of high
recommendations has remained constant and the number of low recommendations has
decreased. As the aim of the Global Settlement is to reduce analysts’ conflicts of interest,
our final hypothesis is stated as follows:

12

H4: The asymmetric responses of affiliated financial analysts have been mitigated
by the Global Settlement and other relevant rules.

4. Methodology and Data
4.1. Sample and variables
We measure earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts. Earnings surprises are
defined as the International Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) actual earnings per share
for quarter q minus the most recent I/B/E/S median earnings forecast preceding the
earnings announcement date (EAD), scaled by the absolute value of analysts’ median
forecasts.10 We estimate analyst median forecasts based on the I/B/E/S Detail History file
and use them as consensus forecasts, as medians are less sensitive than means to outliers.
We select the most recent consensus earnings forecast before an earnings announcement
because previous studies report that recent forecasts are more accurate (e.g., O’Brien,
1988).
Consistent with Doyle et al. (2006), we use decile portfolios to classify large
quarterly earnings surprises as either positive or negative. We begin by sorting the
earnings surprises into two groups: a positive group (including zero surprises) and a
negative group. We then sort each group into deciles based on the magnitude of the
earnings surprises in that quarter. An earnings surprise is classified as a large positive

10

Previous researchers also scale the difference between I/B/E/S earnings per share and analysts’ consensus
earnings forecasts by assets per share (Core et al., 2006), the standard deviation of earnings forecasts
(Mendenhall, 2003), and market price per share at the beginning (or end) of quarter q (Franzoni and Marin,
2006). We use each of these measures of earnings surprises in our robustness checks and obtain similar
results. Another measure of earnings surprises is standardized unexpected earnings. This measure is
predicated on the assumption that earnings follow a seasonal random walk model with a drift, and is
commonly used in the literature on post-earnings-announcement drift. However, as the focus of the current
study is analysts’ reactions to unexpected earnings, we measure earnings surprises relative to analysts’
forecasts rather than using a time-series model of firms’ prior earnings.
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earnings surprise if it is classified in decile 8, 9, or 10 in the positive group. An earnings
surprise is classified as a large negative earnings surprise if it is classified in decile 1, 2,
or 3 in the negative group.11 Moderate earnings surprises (deciles 4, 5, 6, and 7 in both
the positive group and the negative groups) comprise our control groups. Large positive
(negative) earnings surprises indicate that a firm’s reported earnings are well above
(below) analysts’ consensus expectations and generally represent good (bad) news about
the firm for investors.
We define an affiliated analyst as an analyst whose employer has an investment
banking relationship with the firm recommended by the analyst. We obtain the identity of
the underwriter of every IPO, seasoned equity offering (SEO), and bond offering from the
New Issues Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC). We obtain information on
the investment bankers for target and acquirer companies from the Thomson Financial
SDC Platinum mergers and acquisitions (M&A) database. Consistent with previous
research (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999), we identify an
analyst as affiliated if her brokerage firm (1) was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the
recommended stock in the past 5 years; (2) was the underwriter of an SEO or bond
offering of the recommended stock in the past 2 years;12 or (3) advised on an M&A deal
made by the firm with the recommended stock in the past 3 years. We use the I/B/E/S
Broker Code Key to combine the recommendation data with the SDC investment banking
data.

11

In simple terms, we focus on the 30% of earnings surprises with the largest absolute values.
Conrad et al. (2006) assume that an investment banking relationship exists if any debt, IPO, SEO, or
M&A transaction is conducted by the analysts’ firm at any time during the sample period. We repeat our
tests using this definition of affiliated analysts and obtain results similar to those presented here.
12
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4.2. Regression models
Two dates are considered important in this study: quarterly EAD and analysts’
recommendation report date. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of events. We begin by
identifying a firm’s EAD for quarter q from the I/B/E/S Detail History file. We take the
most recent recommendation before the quarter q EAD as the recommendation before the
earnings announcement, or RECbefore.
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We then take the very first (earliest)

recommendation subsequent to the earnings announcement for quarter q (RECafter) to
examine the analysts’ recommendation changes in response to earnings surprises reported
in quarter q (RECafter – RECbefore). We also make sure this recommendation (RECafter) is
issued prior to quarter q+1 EAD. 14
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We are particularly interested in whether affiliated analysts with conflicts of
interest react to large earnings surprises in a significantly different way from unaffiliated
analysts. Consistent with Kolasinksi and Kothari (2008) and Wu et al. (2015), we use an
ordered logit model to test our hypotheses. The regression model is constructed as
follows.
13

As presented in Figure 1, this recommendation may be made either after the firm’s quarter q fiscal period
(illustrated by a solid line) or during the quarter q fiscal period (illustrated by a dotted line). We make sure
that this recommendation is before the next quarterly EAD.
14
Unlike some prior studies, we select the earliest stock report following the earnings announcement for
quarter q rather than the most recent forecast report for the next quarter, q+1, for the following reasons.
First, approximately 26.9% of the recommendations in our sample are made within 7 trading days (i.e., the
EAD plus the next 6 trading days) of the firms’ announcements of their quarterly earnings news. Another
37.2% of the recommendations are made between the next 8 th and 15th trading days. Collectively, more than
60% of the recommendations are made within 15 trading days of the EAD. Therefore, the earliest report
reflects analysts’ immediate response to the arrival of new information and is most relevant to our study.
Second, forecast immediacy, or the speed with which analysts respond to a significant change in publicly
available information, is positively related to forecast usefulness (Mozes, 2003). Third, as the focus of this
study is analysts’ responses to large earnings surprises reported in the previous quarter, we need to control
for changes made to analysts’ recommendations in response to important firm information other than
quarterly earnings announcements. Using the earliest forecast report minimizes the effects of other
information on analysts’ recommendation changes in the time window between large earnings surprises and
subsequent analysts’ recommendation changes.
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UPGRADE = α + β1 SURPRISE+ β2 AFFIL+β3 (SURPRISE×AFFIL)
+β4MEANREC+ β5LREC+ β6ABRET+ β7EXP+ β8BRKSZ
+β9LOGMKV+β10INST+ε
(1)
Stock recommendations in the I/B/E/S dataset are subject to standardized coding
with assigned numerical values (1 = “strong buy,” 2 = “buy,” 3 = “hold,” 4 =
“underperform,” and 5 = “sell”). Consistent with the literature (e.g., Clarke et al., 2006),
we reverse the ordering so that larger numbers indicate more positive recommendations.
Following Kadan et al. (2009), Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), and Wu et al. (2015), we
define the dependent variable, the recommendation changes UPGRADE, according to
whether an analyst’s recommendation becomes more (less) optimistic. In particular,
UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on three values: 1 if a recommendation
change is an upgrade in response to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation does
not change; and -1 if a recommendation change is a downgrade. We do not use the raw
change in recommendation levels based on the I/B/E/S’s 5-tier coding system (-4, -3, -2,
… 2, 3, 4) as the dependent variable because some brokerages use a 3-tier
recommendation system, and thus the level of recommendation changes are not
comparable between brokerages.15
We define AFFIL as a dummy variable equal to 1 if an analyst’s brokerage shares
an investment banking relationship with the firm for which the recommendation is issued,
and 0 otherwise. SURPRISE×AFFIL is the interaction term between SURPRISE and
AFFIL. The coefficient of the interaction item SURPRISE×AFFIL is a measure of

15

In particular, as discussed by Kadan et al. (2009), Kolasinski and Kothari (2008), and Wu et al. (2015),
not all brokerages use a 5-tier recommendation system. Prior to the Global Settlement, about 17% of
recommendations were issued using a 3-tier (buy/hold/sell) system, and this proportion rose to over 75%
following the Global Settlement. Although I/B/E/S has coded the recommendation levels at a 5-tier system,
the calculated changes in recommendation levels across brokerages and analysts using different tiersystems are not comparable. We are grateful to one of the referees for sharing the insight regarding this
issue.
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whether affiliated and unaffiliated analysts respond differently to large earnings surprises.
Other independent variables are defined as follows.
SURPRISE:

MEANREC:
LREC:
ABRET:

EXP:

BRKSZ:

LOGMKV:
INST:

Firm earnings surprise, defined as the I/B/E/S actual
earnings per share minus the most recent I/B/E/S median
earnings forecast preceding the EAD, scaled by the
absolute value of analysts’ median forecasts. We estimate
median forecasts based on the Detail History file.
Average recommendation changes for a firm 5 days before
a recommendation change.
Previous recommendation level before a recommendation
change.
10-day cumulative average abnormal returns (marketadjusted model) for a firm before a recommendation
change.
Analyst experience, measured as the natural logarithm of 1
plus the number of prior quarters in which an analyst has
issued an earnings-forecast report for the firm.16
Size of a brokerage house, measured as the natural
logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts employed by the
brokerage house.
Firm size, measured as the logarithm of the market
capitalization of firm equity.
Institution ownership, measured as the percentage of a
firm’s total outstanding shares held by institutional
investors.

Our first hypothesis states that there is no significant difference between affiliated
and unaffiliated analysts’ responses to large positive earnings surprises. If this hypothesis
holds, we expect that β3 = 0 for the positive earnings surprise sample.
The second hypothesis concerns analysts’ conflicts of interest: although both
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts tend to make recommendation changes in a same way
following large positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are less likely than
unaffiliated analysts to downgrade their stock recommendations following large negative

A shortcoming of this measure of analyst experience is that it does not accommodate analysts’ research
reports before October 1993, the first month for which I/B/E/S recommendation data are available. An
alternative measure is to count analysts’ research reports only after a specific year (e.g., 1995). We use this
measure as a robustness check and obtain similar results on this issue.
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earnings surprises. We estimate the preceding equation using the large negative earnings
surprises. If the second hypothesis holds, we expect that β3 < 0 for the negative earnings
surprise sample.
To control for analyst herding (e.g., Welch, 2000; Hong et al., 2003), we follow
Conrad et al. (2006) in using MEANREC (mean recommendation changes) for 5 days
prior to a recommendation change. We also include the previous recommendation level
(LREC) in the equation, as the higher (lower) the previous recommendation, the less
(more) room the analyst has to upgrade it. In addition, some analysts may change their
recommendations for certain practical reasons. For example, some brokerage firms have
their own explicit stock-valuation models, and require a strict relation between
recommendation levels and 1-year stock-price targets. If abnormal returns at the time of
the earnings surprise are sufficiently large, analysts may have to change their
recommendations to ensure consistency with their firms’ valuation models and internal
policies. To ascertain the probability of this outcome, we use ABRET, the 10-day
cumulative average abnormal returns (market-adjusted model) for a firm before a
recommendation change, as a control variable in the regression model. Prior studies (e.g.,
Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999) have found that analysts with more experience make
more accurate earnings forecasts. We use the control variable EXP as a proxy for analyst
experience. Finally, we use BRKSZ to control for the effect of the size of a brokerage
house or an investment bank, and include firm size (LOGMKV) and institutional holdings
(INST) as possible proxies for the amount of publicly available information about the
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firm, because larger firms and firms with larger institutional holdings tend to release
more information to the public, which facilitates analysts’ recommendations.17
Our third hypothesis states that the responses of influential analysts to large
earnings surprises may differ from those of less influential analysts due to reputation
concerns. More influential affiliated analysts are those employed by more prestigious
investment banks. To determine whether an affiliated analyst is employed by a
prestigious or a less prestigious investment bank, we use a binary classification (INFLU)
based on the investment bank’s market share. INFLU takes a value of 1 if the analyst
works for one of the top 10 investment banks by market share, i.e., Goldman Sachs,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Credit Suisse, Lehman Brothers, JP
Morgan, UBS, Barclay Capital, or Citi, and 0 otherwise. 18 The Carter-Manaster (CM),
Johnson-Miller, and Ritter rankings are formal systems for ranking investment-bank
reputation.19 As our main purpose is to examine changes to the recommendations made
by influential analysts in response to large earnings surprises, rather than to
comprehensively investigate the effects of investment banks’ reputation on analyst
recommendations, we follow Fang (2005) in using a binary variable to distinguish
between prestigious and less prestigious banks.
We use the following regression equation to test the third hypothesis. The
regression includes an interaction between three main effects: SURPRISE, AFFIL, and
INFLU:
17

Our institutional-holdings data are drawn from Thomson Financial/Spectrum.
This list of prestigious investment banks is similar to Fang’s (2005) list, which comprises Goldman
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Credit Suisse, Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan,
and DLJ. Note that in August 2000, Credit Suisse acquired DLJ. We add three banks (UBS, Barclay Capital,
and Citi) to the list based on a recent ranking of investment banks by The Wall Street Journal (October 1,
2009). Our results do not change significantly if the top 8 or top 15 banks are selected as prestigious banks.
19
Jay Ritter’s ranking is primarily based on the CM system, and can be accessed at
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
18
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UPGRADE = α + β1 SURPRISE+ β2 AFFIL+β3 INFLU+ β4 SURPRISE × AFFIL
+ β5 SURPRISE ×INFLU+β6 INFLU ×AFFIL
+ β7 SURPRISE × AFFIL ×INFLU+β8 MEANREC6 + β9LREC
+β10ABRET +β11EXP+β12BRKSZ+β13LOGMKV+β14INST+ε
(2)
We run the regression separately for the large positive and large negative earnings
surprises samples. The variable of interest is SURPRISE × AFFIL × INFLU. If
investment bank reputation helps to reduce affiliated analysts’ conflicts of interest (H3),
we expect β7 >0 for the negative earnings surprises sample.
The fourth hypothesis concerns the effects of the Global Settlement and other
regulations on analyst recommendations. We attempt to determine whether the responses
of affiliated analysts to large earnings surprises have changed since the Global Settlement.
The regression equation is as follows.
UPGRADE = α + β1 SURPRISE+ β2 AFFIL+β3 DREG+ β4 SURPRISE×AFFIL
+β5AFFIL×DREG+ β6 SURPRISE× DREG
+β7 SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG+β8MEANREC
+ β9LREC+β10ABRET+β11EXP+β12BRKSZ+β13LOGMKV+β14INST+ε (3)
Consistent with Kadan et al. (2009), we define DREG as a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if an analyst issues a recommendation report for a firm after September 2002, and
0 if the recommendation is made before September 2002. 20 The month of September
2002 and beyond comprise the period after the enactment of NYSE Rule 472 and NASD
Rule 2711. These two rules require investment banks to create and enforce firewalls that
restrict communication and interaction between investment banking departments and
research analysts. If the Global Settlement is effective in restoring analyst integrity, we
expect the coefficient of the interaction variable of SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG in the
negative earnings surprises group to be significantly positive (β7> 0).
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Our results do not change qualitatively when (1) January 2003, the first month after the Global
Settlement was reached, or (2) December 2003, is used as a cutoff to determine the value of DREG.
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4.3. Descriptive statistics
We obtain analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendation data from the I/B/E/S
database and estimate analyst median forecasts based on the Detail History file. We
obtain data on daily stock returns and firm finances from The Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. We include only ordinary common
shares; certificates and depository receipts, foreign firms, closed-end fund shares, and
real estate investment trusts (CRSP share codes of 10 or 11) are excluded.21 Our earliest
data are drawn from 1994 records, because I/B/E/S recommendation data are only
available from October 1993. The sample ends in 2005 because it was the last year for
I/B/E/S database to provide analyst and broker translation files. The information is
essential in identifying an analyst's employer/broker, from which we are able to
determine whether an analyst is affiliated or not. Consistent with Mendenhall (2004), we
delete firm quarters with only one analyst forecast in the group.
We report the descriptive statistics for the large earnings surprises in Panel A of
Table 1. All of the variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level each year to
minimize the influence of outliers. The sample consists of 52,862 firm-quarter-analyst
observations of 7,568 large quarterly earnings surprises (4,591 positive and 2,977
negative) reported by firms publicly listed in the U.S during the 1994 to 2005 period. As
shown in Panel A, the mean (median) earnings surprise is 55.9% (32.4%) for the large
positive earnings surprises group and -119.6% (-74.2%) for the large negative earnings
surprises group. The standard deviations for large positive and negative surprises groups
are 62.4% and 120%, respectively. We report the mean values of several financial

21

We also exclude utilities (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 4400 and 4499) and
financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999).
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measures in Panel B. The firms reporting large positive and negative surprises are smaller
than the firms reporting moderate surprises—the average market capitalization is $1.19
($0.92) billion for the large positive (negative) surprises sample, compared with more
than $3.0 billion for the moderate-surprises firms. The large positive (negative) surprises
sample has an average beta of 1.15 (1.23), and the moderate-surprises samples have beta
values well below 1.0. The firms with large positive earnings surprises tend to be growth
firms, as indicated by their smaller book-to-market ratios and higher price-to-earnings
ratios. The firms with large negative earnings surprises have conspicuously lower growth
rates (measured by sales and earnings growth) and poorer operating performance than the
firms that report large positive surprises and moderate surprises, as measured by industryadjusted return on equity (ROE).22 Overall, the results in Panel B show that firms with
large positive surprises, firms with large negative surprises, and the control groups vary
significantly in terms of firm size, risk, market-perceived growth opportunities, and
operating profitability. None of these differences are surprising.
In Panel C of Table 1, we report the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the
earnings surprises samples for various event windows around the quarterly EADs. We
find that on average, firms with large positive (negative) earnings surprises earn
significantly positive (negative) risk-adjusted stock returns. The 3-day [-1, +1] market
model (4-factor model) returns are 2.05% (2.02%) for the positive earnings surprises
sample and -1.25% (-1.28%) for the negative earnings surprises sample. A similar pattern
exists for the other event windows. The moderate positive earnings surprises control
sample has relatively “moderate” stock returns, with significant 3-day [-1, +1] market
22

The industry-adjusted ROE is equal to net income before extraordinary items divided by book value of
equity, adjusted by industry median ROE. The industry classification is based on Fama-French’s (1993)
system.

22

model returns of 0.63% and 4-factor adjusted returns of 0.59%. Although the moderate
negative earnings surprises control sample has significantly negative abnormal returns on
the trading day after the earnings surprise announcement, the returns are economically
quite small. The returns presented in Panel C of Table 1 are consistent with previous
findings on market reactions to firms’ earnings announcements (e.g., Bernard and
Thomas, 1990; Doyle et al., 2006).
[Insert Table 1 about here]

5. Empirical Results
5.1. Univariate test
We present the results of a univariate analysis of the analysts’ responses to large
earnings surprises in Table 2. The panel shows that the average recommendation made by
affiliated (unaffiliated) analysts before large positive earnings surprises (RECbefore) is
3.865 (3.739). This level generally represents a “hold” (3) or “buy” (4) rating. In response
to large positive earnings surprises, both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts increase their
recommendations. The average recommendation increase for affiliated and unaffiliated
analysts is 0.045 and 0.053, respectively, and the difference is not significant, with a
bootstrapping p-value smaller than 0.18. 23 The responses to large negative earnings
23

As the distribution of analyst recommendations is non-normal and right-skewed, we report bootstrapped
p-values rather than conventional t-statistics. Following Hertzel et al. (2002), we perform the bootstrapping
procedure as follows. First, we calculate the average recommendation levels for affiliated analysts in the
large positive earnings surprises sample before and after the quarterly EAD, and obtain the difference
between them (RECafter – RECbefore). We then group the recommendation ratings and randomly select
recommendation ratings with replacements to construct our first pseudo-sample. Next, we estimate the
recommendation change for this pseudo-sample as the first mean-difference observation (recommendation
change). We repeat this procedure 1,000 times to obtain 1,000 observations of pseudo-sample
recommendation changes. This procedure yields empirical distributions of recommendation changes under
the null hypothesis of no mean difference. Finally, the null hypothesis is rejected at the α% level if the
recommendation change for our sample firms is less than the (1-α) percentile recommendation changes in
the empirical distribution of the pseudo-samples. We apply the same procedure to the large negative and
moderate earnings surprises samples.
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surprises are somewhat different. The average recommendation rating made by affiliated
analysts before large negative earnings surprises is 3.425 (between “hold” and “buy”).
Although this rating decreases to 3.416 after negative earnings surprises, the decrease is
not significant. In contrast, the average recommendation made by unaffiliated analysts
decreases by 0.345 from 3.356 to 3.011 following large negative earnings surprises. This
decrease is significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with a difference
between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ behavior following large negative earnings
surprises, and thus provide preliminary support for the existence of analyst conflicts of
interest.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
5.2. Tests of H1 and H2
We now turn to the results of an ordered logistic regression of the changes made
to analysts’ recommendations in response to large earnings surprises. We first report
descriptive statistics for the variables in the regression models in Panel A and B of Table
3. About 15.8% (17.0%) of the recommendation changes are made by affiliated analysts
in the large positive (negative) surprises sample; 26.7% (28.2%) of the recommendation
changes are made by influential analysts employed by prestigious investment banks in the
large positive (negative) surprises sample. More importantly, we do not find any
significant differences in the means or medians of the major variables across affiliated
and unaffiliated analysts in either the large positive or negative surprises samples. This
suggests that the potential endogenous determination of analyst affiliation is not a major
concern in our sample. That is, it does not appear that affiliated analysts are more likely
to follow a certain type of firm, which might cause systematically different
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recommendation changes when the firms report large positive or negative earnings
surprises.
We present the regression results for Equation (1) in Panel C of Table 3. As
shown in model (1), for the positive earnings surprises sample, the coefficient of
SURPRISE is 0.019 (p>0.006), suggesting a direct relationship between the magnitude of
large positive earnings surprises and the likelihood that unaffiliated analysts will increase
their stock-recommendation ratings. The key variable used to test the first and second
hypothesis is SURPRISE×AFFIL. For the large positive earnings surprises sample, the
coefficient of SURPRISE×AFFIL is 0.013 (p>0.155), which is not statistically
significant. Consistent with our first hypothesis, this indicates no significant differences
in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following large
positive earnings surprises—they are equally likely to upgrade stocks.
Model (2) shows the regression results for H2. For the negative earnings surprises
sample, the coefficient of SURPRISE is 0.014 (p>0.007). As a small number indicates a
larger negative earnings surprise, the result implies that the larger (smaller) a negative
earnings surprise, the more (less) likely unaffiliated analysts are to lower their stockrecommendations. The key variable, SURPRISE×AFFIL, has a coefficient of -0.031
(p>0.005), suggesting that following a large negative earnings surprise, affiliated analysts
are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade recommendations. To further
interpret the coefficient for the interaction term of SURPRISE×AFFIL, we follow Wu et
al. (2015) and estimate the difference in marginal effect with respect to AFFIL for each
possible level of the UPGRADE (i.e., 1, 0, and -1) for the negative earnings surprises
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sample. 24 Regarding the probability of recommendation downgrade (UPGRADE = -1),
the marginal effect is significantly more negative for affiliated analysts than for
unaffiliated analysts (difference in margin effects = -0.078, p<0.001). Conversely,
regarding the probability of recommendation upgrade (UPGRADE = 1), the marginal
effect of analyst affiliation status (AFFIL) for earnings surprises is significantly more
positive for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts (difference in marginal effects
= 0.042, p<0.001).25 Collectively, these results are consistent with the findings reported
in Panel C of Table 3 and provide strong support of H2: affiliated analysts are less likely
to downgrade stocks subsequent to announcements of large negative earnings surprises.
The coefficients of the control variables in the regressions (both model (1) and
(2)) generally have the predicted signs. MEANREC measures analysts’ herding behavior
(Conrad et al., 2006), and it has a positive and significant coefficient for both positive and
negative earnings surprise samples. This suggests that the probability of a
recommendation upgrade (downgrade) is higher if other analysts at the same firm
upgrade (downgrade) the stock during the prior 10-day period. This result is consistent
with previous findings on analysts’ herding behavior (Welch, 2000; Hong et al., 2003).
We also find a strong and highly significant negative relation between the probability of
an upgrade and previous recommendation levels (LREC). This result is consistent with
our expectations, as there is little or no room to upgrade (downgrade) when previous
recommendations are already very high (low). The variable ABRET has a significant and
24

The interpretation of interaction effects in non-linear models (such as a logistic regression used here) is
not quite as simple as in linear models. A significant coefficient for an interaction is not necessarily
evidence of a significant difference in probabilities across groups. Therefore, following a comment from
one of our anonymous referees, we report the difference in marginal effects across groups.
25
Regarding the probability of no change of recommendation (UPGRADE = 0) in response to large
negative earnings surprises, the marginal effect of analyst affiliation status (AFFIL) for earnings surprises is
also significantly more positive for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated analysts (difference in marginal
effects = 0.036, p<0.001)
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negative coefficient in both samples. This suggests that if the abnormal returns around a
positive earnings surprise are sufficiently large, an analyst may lower his
recommendation to ensure its consistency with his valuation model. In contrast, if the
abnormal returns around a negative earnings surprise are sufficiently low, an analyst may
have to increase his recommendation to ensure consistency with his valuation model.
There is a significant positive association between analysts’ research experience
and recommendation changes: analysts with more experience tend to be more likely to
make recommendation changes. Experienced analysts may be better able to interpret
information (e.g., Clement, 1999; Mikhail et al., 1997 and 1999; Cao and Kohlbeck,
2014). Using the number of analysts employed by a firm as a measure of brokerage size,
we find that analysts employed by a large brokerage firm or investment bank are more
likely to upgrade their recommendations following large negative earnings surprises.
These analysts may suffer more severe conflicts of interest because a large proportion of
their revenue depends on investment banking (Aggarwal and Chen, 2008). There is also a
positive relationship between recommendation upgrades and institutional holdings
(INST). Firms with larger institutional holdings tend to release more information to the
public, which facilitates analysts’ recommendations.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
5.3. Test of H3
In this section, we test H3 by determining whether influential and less influential
affiliated analysts respond differently to large earnings surprises due to the disciplinary
function of reputation concern. Influential affiliated analysts are those employed by more
prestigious investment banks. We conduct a regression analysis of the large positive and
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negative earnings surprises samples separately, and report the results of Equation (2) in
Table 4. The coefficients of SURPRISE×AFFIL are 0.014 (p>0.160) and -0.022
(p>0.021) for the large positive and negative earnings surprise samples, respectively.
These results suggest that for less influential analysts, while there is no significant
difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts
following positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are more reluctant than
unaffiliated analysts to downgrade stock recommendations in response to negative
earnings surprises. The variable of interest is a three-way interaction term of
SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU. For the large positive earnings surprise sample, the
coefficient of SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU is 0.012, and it is not statistically significant
(p>0.130). This finding implies that the responses of influential and less influential
affiliated analysts to large positive earnings surprises are similar—they are equally likely
to upgrade stocks. In contrast, for the negative earnings surprise sample,
SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU has a coefficient of -0.020 and it is statistically significant
(p>0.038). Further examining the difference in marginal effects across groups for large
negative earnings surprises firms, we find that with respect to the probability of
recommendation upgrade (UPGRADE=1), the marginal effect of INFLU for
SURPRISE×AFFIL is significantly more positive for influential analysts than for less
influential analysts (difference in marginal effects = 0.038, p<0.001). Conversely, the
marginal effect of INFLU regarding the probability of recommendation downgrade
(UPGRADE = -1) is significant more negative for affiliated analysts than for unaffiliated
analysts (difference in margin effects = -0.075, p<0.001). This indicates that following
large negative earnings surprises, influential affiliated analysts are less likely to
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downgrade a firm’s stock. These results do not support H3, indicating that reputation
concern is not an effective mechanism for restoring the integrity of financial analysts.
Our findings here are in line with those of Fang and Yasuda (2009), who show
that a bank’s reputation does not effectively mitigate the biased forecasts of analysts with
conflicts of interest.26 Concern for their personal reputation may give influential analysts
an even stronger incentive to maintain good relationships with managers, who constitute
an important source of information for stock research (e.g., Francis et al., 1997; Das et
al., 1998).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
5.4. Test of H4
We then proceed to test H4, which concerns the effects of the Global Settlement
and other regulations on analyst recommendations. Table 5 presents the regression results
for Equation (3) for both positive and negative earnings surprise samples. We focus on
whether the responses of affiliated analysts to large earnings surprises have changed since
the Global Settlement and other relevant rules. DREG measures the main effect of the
Global Settlement, and it has insignificant coefficient in both models, suggesting that the
effectiveness of the Global Settlement is not significant in reducing the optimism in
unaffiliated analysts. The coefficients of SURPRISE×AFFIL are 0.010 (p>0.151) and 0.026 (p>0.041) for the large positive and negative earnings surprise samples,
respectively. Consistent with the results reported in previous tables, these results indicate
different reactions between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts in response to large
26

Under the Global Settlement, 10 of the largest Wall Street banks paid $1.4 billion to federal regulators to
settle the charge made by the government that the banks had issued optimistic stock reports to win
investment banking clients. Jack Grubman, once a top analyst at Salomon Smith Barney, paid millions in
fines and was banned from the investment industry for life. The involvement of highly regarded analysts
and banks in the scandal appears to support our findings.
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positive and negative earnings surprises prior to the Global Settlement. The variable of
interest is the interaction variable SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG. As shown in Table 5, the
coefficients of the variables are not statistically significant in either the large positive or
large negative earnings surprises groups. The coefficients of the other variables are
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. As this finding indicates little
significant change in analysts’ reactions subsequent to large earnings surprises after the
Global Settlement, our fourth hypothesis is not supported. But our results here are in line
with Di Lorenzo’s (2007) argument that laws do not necessarily determine corporate
conduct. Kadan et al. (2009) report similar finding; that is, affiliated analysts are still
reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations after the Global Settlement.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
5.5. Corroborative evidence on analysts’ dropping coverage and other tests
In the tests reported in Table 3, UPGRADE is scored as 1, 0, or -1. UPGRADE =
0 indicates that analysts do not alter their recommendations subsequent to large earnings
surprises. Some analysts may simply drop their coverage, particularly following large
negative earnings surprises. Therefore, we conduct a further test to determine whether
analysts are more likely to drop their coverage or to maintain their previous
recommendations in response to large negative earnings surprises. The regression model
is similar to that in Equation (1), except that we use a logit model rather than an ordered
logistic model. The dependent variable DROP is defined as 1 if an analyst drops his
coverage subsequent to firm large earnings surprises, and 0 if an analyst maintains his
previous recommendation or does not provide a recommendation update. In the large
negative earnings surprises sample, we find 705 cases of analysts’ dropping their
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coverage and 3,655 observations in which no recommendation changes are made. We use
these observations to conduct the logit regression. The coefficient of SURPRISE×AFFIL
is -0.011 (p>0.031), indicating that affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated
analysts to drop their coverage after a firm reports a large negative earnings surprise. This
finding provides further support for H2 regarding analysts’ conflicts of interest.27
We use mean recommendation changes to control for potential herding behavior
in previous regression models; however, the mean changes are likely to be affected by
extreme upgrades or downgrades. Alternatively, we use the number of analysts following
a firm to control for herding behavior. In addition, we control for the number of days
between the earnings reporting date and the date of analysts’ recommendations. Our main
results remain consistent after these changes to the model specifications. 28
5.6. Market reactions to analysts’ recommendation changes
Panel A of Table 6 presents the stock returns surrounding analysts’
recommendation changes. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Womack, 1996), we find a
significant

market

response

to

analysts’

recommendation

changes.

For

the

recommendation upgrades issued by affiliated (unaffiliated) analysts subsequent to large
positive earnings surprises, the mean 3-day [-1, +1] 4-factor CARs are 3.60% (3.09%),
and the differences in returns for affiliated and unaffiliated analysts are insignificant at
the 5% level.29 Panels A and B of Figure 2 present the stock returns and abnormal trading
volume, respectively, around the recommendation changes. We estimate the abnormal

27

Due to space limitations, this table is not presented here. It is available from the authors upon request.
We thank one of our referees for these suggestions. The results are not tabulated here to save space; they
are available from the authors upon request.
29
We include stock returns 1 day before the issuance of the analyst’s recommendation report to incorporate
possible information leakage.
28
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volume or mean-adjusted volume for the comparison period by subtracting the arithmetic
mean volume of the jth firm calculated over the estimation period from its volume on day
t. The estimation period comprises 250 trading days before the event window. We find
that the market reaction in terms of both stock returns and trading volume is identical for
recommendation upgrades issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts subsequent to
large positive earnings surprises.
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The stock returns following recommendation

downgrades after large negative earnings surprises are reported in Panel A of Table 6.
We find fairly large negative stock returns for recommendation downgrades. In addition,
we find that the differences in the returns following downgrades by affiliated and
unaffiliated analysts are insignificant. We plot these returns and abnormal-volume values
in Panels C and D of Figure 2, which are similar to Panels A and B. Investors do not
appear to react differently to the recommendation changes issued by affiliated and
unaffiliated analysts subsequent to large positive and negative earnings surprises.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Some caution is necessary when interpreting the 3-day CARs around the
recommendation changes. Approximately 16% of the recommendation changes in our
sample were made on day 0 or day 1 following an earnings surprise. Earnings surprises
and recommendation changes may thus confound the measurements of abnormal returns.
Therefore, we run the regression again after removing observations in which analysts
make recommendation changes 2 days after the earnings announcement; we obtain
similar significant results.
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The mean-adjusted abnormal volume is much greater in reaction to unaffiliated upgrade announcements
than to affiliated upgrade announcements.
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Finally, we test whether investors rationally discount or naïvely follow the
opinions of analysts (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). According
to the rational-discounting hypothesis, investors fully expect sell-side analysts to be
subject to potential conflicts of interest, and adjust analysts’ opinions accordingly when
making investment decisions. As affiliated analysts are likely to be more optimistic in
their stock recommendations, investors will discount their recommendation upgrades
(downgrades) more (less) heavily than those of unaffiliated analysts. However, when
affiliated analysts issue unfavorable stock opinions, rational investors expect these
opinions to be more valuable because they are expressed despite conflicts of interest. In
contrast, the naïve-investor hypothesis states that investors do not take analysts’ conflicts
of interest into account and make investment decisions merely on the basis of analysts’
opinions. To examine these hypotheses, we regress abnormal stock returns on analyst
affiliation while controlling for other variables, as follows.
CAR = α + β1DRECCHG + β2AFFIL+β3 AFFIL×DRECCHG + β4 SURPRISE
+β5EXP+β6BRKSZ+β7LOGMKV+β8INST+β9 DDAYS×DRECCHG+ε (4)
The new variables are defined as follows.
CAR:

Cumulative average abnormal returns measured in a [-1, +1]-day
event window using the market-adjusted model.
DRECCHG: Dummy variable equal to 1 for an upgrade recommendation for
firm i at time t subsequent to earnings surprises in quarter q, and 0
for a downgrade or reiteration.
DDAYS:
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the earliest recommendation is made
within 7 trading days (0 to 6) of a firm’s quarterly earnings
announcement, and 0 otherwise.31
The other variables are defined as previously described. We include an interaction
variable between DDAYS and DRECCHG to test whether the market reacts differently to
31

As a robustness check, we also use DDAYS, the number of trading days after the firm’s quarterly EAD
when recommendations are made, as an independent variable in the regression equation. This yields similar
results.
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earlier versus later recommendations. We perform separate regression analyses for the
large positive and negative earnings surprise samples. The rational-discounting
hypothesis predicts that β3 < 0, and the naïve-investors hypothesis predicts that β3 = 0.
We present the regression results for Equation (4) in Panel B of Table 6. For the
large positive earnings surprises sample, the coefficient of the dummy variable
DRECCHG is 0.012 (t = 4.35), indicating that recommendation upgrades are associated
with higher stock returns than recommendation downgrades or reiterations. This finding
is consistent with the results reported in Table 2. The affiliation dummy variable AFFIL
and the interaction term AFFIL ×DRECCHG have coefficients of -0.053 (t = -0.91) and 0.010 (t = -1.34), which are not statistically significant. This suggests that investors
respond similarly to the recommendation changes made by affiliated and unaffiliated
analysts. We also find negative but insignificant coefficients for the interaction variables
DDAYS and DRECCHG. This suggests that investors’ reactions to earlier
recommendations (within 7 trading days of the EAD) are not significantly different from
their reactions to later recommendations. The results for the large negative earnings
surprise sample are similar to those obtained using model (2).
[Insert Table 6 about here]

6. Conclusions
Financial analysts play a vital role in disseminating information in capital
markets. Their activities enhance the overall well-being of capital markets, as their
reports and recommendations help investors and can be used to monitor managers.
However, the extent to which analysts fulfil their professional responsibility depends on
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their integrity, a fundamental component of ethical behavior. Using a sample of analysts’
recommendation changes in response to earnings surprises, we test four hypotheses
concerning the causes and prevention of threats to the integrity of financial analysts. We
find empirical support for the hypotheses that conflicts of interest encountered by
affiliated

analysts

reduce their

independence

and thus

their

integrity.

The

recommendation responses of affiliated analysts are asymmetric. Specifically, whereas
there is no significant difference in recommendation changes between affiliated and
unaffiliated analysts subsequent to positive earnings surprises, affiliated analysts are
more reluctant than unaffiliated analysts to downgrade their recommendations or drop
their coverage of stocks in response to large negative surprises.
We also predict that the reputation concern of prestigious investment banks and
the Global Settlement have a disciplinary function in enhancing analysts’ integrity.
Biased reports in which overvalued stocks are recommended to investors lead to losses,
which injure the reputation of both financial analysts and investment banks. The Global
Settlement removed the connection between analysts’ compensation and investment
banking business, and required firms to limit internal communication and interaction by
separating their securities-offering departments from their stock-analysis departments to
mitigate conflicts of interest. However, we find no empirical support for these hypotheses.
In fact, we find that positively biased recommendations continue to mislead investors, as
investors often fail to recognize the threat to integrity of conflicts of interest, despite
distinguishing between recommendations made by unaffiliated and affiliated financial
analysts.
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The findings raise further concerns regarding the ethics and standards for the
professional conduct of financial analysts. Despite the efforts made by regulators and
organizations of financial analysts (such as the CFA Institute), conflicts of interest in the
capital market continue to threaten the integrity of financial analysts, who often
disseminate misleading information through biased recommendations. We advise future
researchers to investigate more effective mechanisms for disciplining financial analysts
and encouraging them to retain their integrity when conflicts of interest occur.
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Appendix A: Analysts’ Recommendations and Earnings Forecasts for New Century
Financial Corporation Subsequent to Quarterly Earnings Surprises

EAD
Consensus (Mean)
Actual
Earnings Surprise
Recommendations Summary as
of
Strong Buy
Buy
Hold
Underperform
Sell
Number of Analysts
Consensus Rating
Earnings Revisions in 12/2006
Upward Revisions
Downward Revisions
Earnings Revisions in 3/2007
Upward Revisions
Downward Revisions
Corporate Event

Underwriters

Stock Closing Prices as of

Q3:06
11/2/2006
$1.89
$1.12
-41%

Q2:06
8/3/2006
$1.85
$1.81
-2%

Q1:06
5/4/2006
$1.46
$1.79
23%

Q4:05
2/2/2006
$1.82
$2.00
10%

3/2007 (delisting week) 12/2006 (one month after Q3:06)
0
2
1
5
7
2
2
0
2
1
12
10
3.4 (hold)
2.3 (buy)
Q4:06
Q1:07
FY:06
FY:07
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Q4:06
Q1:07
FY:06
FY:07
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
1
$50 Million Private Placement of Trust Preferred
Securities on 9/13/2006
$50 Million Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Stock on
8/16/2006
Bear, Stearns & Co. and Morgan Stanley were the cobook running lead managers for the offering, with Stifel
Nicolaus and Jefferies & Company as co-managers.
3/14/2007 3/1/2007 12/1/2006 8/1/2006 5/1/2006
$0.67
$15.85
$35.71
$44.35
$51.97

Sources: Finance.Yahoo.com and various New Century Financial Corporation 10Q
forms.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for firms with large earnings surprises
This table provides summary statistics (Panel A), mean values of financial characteristics (Panel B) and stock returns
(Panel C) for the firms with large earnings surprises. We define earnings surprises as the I/B/E/S actual earnings per
share for quarter q minus the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the quarterly EAD, scaled by the absolute
value of analysts’ median forecasts. Following Doyle et al. (2006), we classify earnings surprises into large positive
and large negative groups using decile portfolios. In Panel B, we report the mean values of several financial measures.
SIZE is equal to the closing price at the end of June of year t multiplied by the common shares outstanding at the end of
June of year t. ASSETS denotes item 6 of the Compustat data at the end of the fiscal year. BM, or book-to-market is
calculated as the book value of equity t-1/the market value of equity t-1, where the book value of equity is the book value
of the stockholders’ equity (item 216), plus the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35, if
available), minus the book value of the preferred stock (item 56: preferred stock redemption value; item 10: preferred
stock liquidating value; or item 130: preferred stock carrying value, in the order of data availability). PE or price to
earnings is equal to market capitalization: (item 24*item 25)/the earnings before extraordinary items (item 18). SALES
GROWTH is calculated as Sales t-1/sales t-2 (item 12). EARNIGNS GROWTH is the earnings before extraordinary items:
t-1/the earnings before extraordinary items t-2 (item 18). ROE is equal to the net income before extraordinary items: item
123/the book value of equity, adjusted by the industry median ROE. All the variables are winsorized at the 1% and
99% level each year to minimize the influence of outliers. The industry classification is based on a study by Fama and
French (1993). BETA is calculated by regressing the stock’s daily return on the value-weighted market return using
ordinary least squares for 100 trading days’ worth of returns data ending on December 31 of year t. In Panel C, the
event date (quarterly earnings announcement date) is taken from the I/B/E/S Detail file. The t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Summary statistics for large positive and negative earnings surprises
Large positive
earnings surprises
Large negative
earnings surprises

Mean

Median

SD

Min

Q1

Q3

Max

N

0.559

0.324

0.624

0.120

0.216

0.600

4.000

4,591

-1.196

-0.742

1.200

-7.727

-1.267

-0.516

-0.310

2,977

Panel B: Mean values of financial characteristics of forms with large earnings surprises

Large positive (+)
earnings surprises
Large negative (–)
earnings surprises
Moderate earnings
surprises (+)
Moderate earnings
surprises (–)

SIZE
($ mil.)

ASSETS
($ mil.)

BM

PE

SALES
GROWTH

EARNINGS
GRWOTH

ROE

BETA

1,187.01

2,065.71

1.12

23.05

67%

40%

5%

1.15

918.31

1,023.10

--

--

-37%

-6%

-4%

1.23

3,546.24

4,066.89

1.65

16.04

25%

15%

2%

0.85

3,036.78

3,738.78

1.30

15.82

5%

-0%

0%

0.72

Panel C: Stock returns of firms with large earnings surprises
Event
windows

-1
0
+1
[-1, +1]
[-1, +4]

Large positive earnings
surprises (%)
CAR
CAR
(Market
(4-Factor)
Model)
0.51***
0.51***
(10.43)
(11.39)
0.85***
0.82***
(17.43)
(18.44)
0.69***
0.69***
(14.22)
(15.42)
2.05***
2.02***
(24.29)
(26.13)
1.76***
1.70***
(14.71)
(15.60)

Large negative earnings
surprises (%)
CAR
CAR (4(Market
Factor)
Model)
-0.92***
-0.91***
(-7.04)
(-7.03)
-0.43***
-0.45***
(-7.70)
(-7.26)
-0.83***
-0.84***
(-3.43)
(-13.71)
-1.25***
-1.28***
(-11.7)
(-12.03)
-1.39***
-1.43***
(-9.15)
(-9.53)
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Moderate earnings surprises (%)
Positive
Negative
CAR
CAR
CAR (4CAR (4(Market
(Market
Factor)
Factor)
Model)
Model)
0.19***
0.18***
0.14***
0.13***
(5.49)
(5.66)
(4.75)
(4.49)
0.28***
0.26***
0.04
0.03
(8.06)
(8.51)
(1.41)
(1.02)
0.16***
0.15***
-0.10***
-0.11***
(4.56)
(4.86)
(-3.45)
(-3.65)
0.63***
0.59***
0.08
0.05
(10.46)
(10.99)
(1.56)
(1.08)
0.54***
0.47***
-0.04
-0.08
(6.33)
(6.25)
(-0.55)
(-1.09)

Table 2: Univariate analysis of analysts’ recommendation changes subsequent to large earnings surprises
In this table, the recommendation changes made by analysts before and after the firm’s quarterly EAD are compared.
The recommendation changes are calculated as the difference between the most recent recommendation before the
quarter q EAD (RECbefore) and the very first (or earliest) analyst recommendation subsequent to the quarter q EAD
(RECafter) but before the next quarter q+1 EAD. For each quarter, we calculate the average recommendation ratings
before and after large earnings surprises for both the affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, and the difference in the
analysts’ recommendation changes following large earnings surprises (RECafter – RECbefore). We average the results
across the sample period. Following previous studies (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999),
we identify analysts as affiliated if their investment bank (1) was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the recommended
stock in the past 5 years; (2) was the underwriter of an SEO or bond offering of the recommended stock in the past 2
years; or (3) acted as an advisor during an M&A deal made by the firm with the recommended stock during the past 3
years. We obtain the M&A, IPO and SEO data from the SDC’s datasets. As the distribution of analyst
recommendations is non-normal and right-skewed, we report bootstrapped p-values rather than conventional t-statistics
in the last column. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.

Firms with large
positive earnings
surprises
Firms with large
negative earnings
surprises

RECbefore

RECafter

Recommendation
change (RECafter –
RECbefore)

Recommendation
change (bootstrapped p
value)

Affiliated analysts

3.865

3.910

0.045***

< 0.01

Unaffiliated analysts
Difference
Affiliated analysts

3.739
0.126
3.425

3.792
0.118
3.416

0.053***
-0.008
-0.009

< 0.01
< 0.18
< 0.15

Unaffiliated analysts

3.356

3.011

-0.345***

< 0.01

Difference

0.069

0.405

0.336***

< 0.01
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Table 3: Analysis of analyst recommendation changes following large earnings surprises
Panel A and B present descriptive statistics of main variables used in the regression model for large positive and
negative earnings surprises samples, respectively. Panel C shows the regression results of testing the first and second
hypotheses. The regression equation is specified as in Equation (1). The dependent variable, the recommendation
changes or UPGRADE, is defined based on whether an analyst’s recommendation becomes more (less) optimistic. In
particular, UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on three values: 1 if a recommendation change is an
upgrade subsequent to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation does not change; and -1 if a recommendation
change is a downgrade. AFFIL is an indicator variable of affiliated or unaffiliated analysts. We identify an analyst as
affiliated if her brokerage firm (1) was the lead underwriter of an IPO of the recommended stock in the past 5 years; (2)
was the underwriter of an SEO or bond offering of the recommended stock in the past 2 years; or (3) advised on an
M&A deal made by the firm with the recommended stock in the past 3 years. We use the I/B/E/S Broker Code Key to
combine the recommendation data with the SDC investment banking data. The sample starts from 1994 and ends 2005
because it was the last year for I/B/E/S database to provide analyst and broker translation files. MEANREC is the
average recommendation changes for a firm 5 days before a recommendation change. LREC is previous
recommendation level before a recommendation change. ABRET is 10-day cumulative average abnormal returns
(market-adjusted model) for a firm before a recommendation change. EXP is analyst experience, measured as the
natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of prior quarters in which an analyst has issued an earnings-forecast report for
the firm. BRKSZ is size of a brokerage house, measured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts
employed by the brokerage house. LOGMKV is firm size, measured as the logarithm of the market capitalization of
firm equity. INST is institution ownership, measured as the percentage of a firm’s total outstanding shares held by
institutional investors. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics of main variables used in regression analysis for positive earnings surprises sample
Full sample
Firms covered by
Firms covered by
affiliated analysts
unaffiliated analysts
Mean
Median
Mean Median
Mean
Median

Difference

SURPRISE

0.559

0.324

0.598

0.333

0.548

0.322

Mean
difference
0.050

AFFIL
INFLU
MEANREC
LREC
ABRET
LOGEXP
LOGBRKSZ
LOGMKV
INST
DREG

0.158
0.267
0.041
3.596
0.013
2.685
3.518
7.450
0.429
0.385

0.000
0.000
0.000
4.000
0.011
2.651
3.590
7.354
0.309
0.000

1.000
0.274
0.044
3.651
0.018
2.675
3.535
7.301
0.444
0.380

1.000
0.000
0.000
4.000
0.014
2.639
3.601
7.276
0.336
0.000

0.000
0.261
0.039
3.582
0.012
2.688
3.502
7.569
0.411
0.389

0.000
0.000
0.000
4.000
0.010
2.657
3.584
7.496
0.301
0.000

1.000***
0.013
0.005
0.069
0.006
-0.013
0.033
-0.268
0.033
-0.009
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Median
difference
0.011
1.000***
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.004
-0.018
0.017
-0.220
0.035
0.000

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for main variables used in the regression for negative earnings surprises sample
Full sample
Firms covered by
Firms covered by
affiliated analysts
unaffiliated analysts
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
Mean
Median

Difference

SURPRISE

-1.196

-0.743

-1.270

-0.750

-1.175

-0.739

Mean
difference
-0.095

AFFIL
INFLU
MEANREC
LREC
ABRET
LOGEXP
LOGBRKSZ
LOGMKV
INST
DREG

0.170
0.282
-0.123
3.358
-0.015
2.521
3.228
7.058
0.434
0.349

0.000
0.000
0.000
3.000
-0.011
2.405
3.332
6.896
0.215
0.000

1.000
0.292
-0.137
3.396
-0.016
2.554
3.262
6.888
0.489
0.351

1.000
0.000
0.000
3.000
-0.013
2.434
3.401
6.772
0.230
0.000

0.000
0.268
-0.113
3.347
-0.014
2.506
3.217
7.107
0.425
0.338

0.000
0.000
0.000
3.000
-0.010
2.395
3.332
6.956
0.203
0.000

1.000***
0.024
-0.024
0.049
-0.002
0.048
0.045
-0.219
0.064
0.013
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Median
difference
-0.011
1.000***
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.003
0.039
0.069
-0.184
0.027
0.000

Panel C: Regression analysis of H1 and H2
Large positive earnings surprise
observations
Model (1)
Coefficient
Pr > chi-square
SURPRISE
0.019***
AFFIL
0.135
SURPRISE×AFFIL
0.013
MEANREC
0.177***
LREC
-0.022***
ABRET
-0.202*
EXP
0.046***
BRKSZ
0.077
LOGMKV
0.013
INST
0.006*
N
33,084
Log likelihood
-36,224.55 ***
Incremental marginal effect of AFFIL for
SURPRISE (UPGRADE=-1)
Incremental marginal effect of AFFIL for
SURPRISE (UPGRADE=+1)
Incremental marginal effect of AFFIL for
SURPRISE (UPGRADE=0)

0.006
0.104
0.155
< 0.001
0.005
0.061
0.002
<0.121
0.138
0.058
<0.001

Large negative earnings surprise
observations
Model (2)
Coefficient
Pr > chi-square
0.014***
0.112**
-0.031***
0.329***
-0.043***
-0.129*
0.067***
0.015*
0.018
0.007*
19,778
-24,463.91 ***

0.007
0.041
0.005
< 0.001
0.005
0.059
<0.001
0.062
0.126
0.063
<0.001

-0.015

-0.078***

0.006

0.042***

0.009

0.036***
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Table 4: Analyst recommendation changes and reputation concern
This table displays the results of testing the recommendation changes made by influential affiliated analysts following
large earnings surprises. The regression equation is specified as in Equation (2). The dependent variable, the
recommendation changes or UPGRADE, is defined based on whether an analyst’s recommendation becomes more
(less) optimistic. In particular, UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on three values: 1 if a recommendation
change is an upgrade subsequent to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation does not change; and -1 if a
recommendation change is a downgrade. To determine whether an affiliated analyst is employed by a prestigious or a
less prestigious investment bank, we use a binary classification (INFLU) based on the investment bank’s market share.
INFLU takes a value of 1 if an analyst works for one of the top 10 investment banks by market share, and 0 otherwise.
Other variables are defined as in Table 3. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.

Large positive earnings surprise
observations
Model (1)
Pr > chiCoefficient
square
0.011**
0.024
0.115
0.165
0.060*
0.088
0.014
0.160
0.010
0.137
0.014
0.144
0.012
0.130
0.153***
< 0.001
< 0.001
-0.020***
0.052
-0.108*

SURPRISE
AFFIL
INFLU
SURPRISE×AFFIL
SURPRISE×INFLU
INFLU×AFFIL
SURPRISE×AFFIL×INFLU
MEANREC
LREC
ABRET
EXP
0.036***
BRKSZ
0.060
LOGMKV
0.009
INST
0.005*
N
33,084
Log likelihood
-34,297.76***
Incremental marginal effect of INFLU for
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=-1)
Incremental marginal effect of INFLU for
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=+1)
Incremental marginal effect of AFFIL for
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=0)

<0.001
<0.137
0.180
0.052
<0.001

Large negative earnings surprise
observations
Model (2)
Coefficient

Pr > chi-square

0.014***
0.107**
0.019**
-0.022**
-0.019*
-0.011*
-0.020**
0.131***
-0.048***
-0.147***
0.051***
0.032**
0.012
0.006*
19,778
-26,284.81***

0.006
0.030
0.040
0.021
0.057
0.085
0.038
< 0.001
<0.001
0.002
<0.001
0.023
0.109
0.070
< 0.001

-0.013

-0.075***

0.005

0.038***

0.008

0.037***
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Table 5: Regression analysis of effects of Global Settlement on analysts’ recommendation changes in response to
large earnings surprises
This table displays the results of a regression analysis of the effects of the Global Settlement on analysts’
recommendation changes in response to large earnings surprises. The regression equation is defined as in Equation (3).
The dependent variable, the recommendation changes or UPGRADE, is defined based on whether an analyst’s
recommendation becomes more (less) optimistic. In particular, UPGRADE is a categorical variable that can take on
three values: 1 if a recommendation change is an upgrade subsequent to an earnings surprise; 0 if the recommendation
does not change; and -1 if a recommendation change is a downgrade. DREG is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1
if analyst j issues a recommendation report for firm i after the Global Settlement (after September 2002) and 0 if the
recommendation is made before the Global Settlement. Other variables are defined as in Table 3. The symbols ***, **
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Independent variables

Positive large earnings surprises
sample
Coefficient
Pr > chi-square

SURPRISE
0.012**
AFFIL
0.124
DREG
0.012
SURPRISE×AFFIL
0.010
AFFIL×DREG
0.063
SURPRISE×DREG
0.009
SURPRISE×AFFIL×DREG
-0.044
MEANREC
0.190***
LREC
-0.031***
ABRET
-0.210***
EXP
0.050***
BRKSZ
0.084
LOGMKV
0.012
INST
0.006*
N
33,084
Log likelihood
-19,342.41***
Incremental marginal effect of DREG for
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=-1)
Incremental marginal effect of INFLU for
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=+1)
Incremental marginal effect of AFFIL for
SURPRISE×AFFIL (UPGRADE=0)

0.039
0.144
0.196
0.151
0.128
0.197
0.141
< 0.001
0.004
<0.001
0.002
<0.121
0.160
0.091
<0.001

Negative large earnings surprises
sample
Coefficient
Pr > chi-square
0.021**
0.130*
-0.062
-0.026**
-0.045
-0.010
0.014
0.319***
-0.045***
-0.120***
0.139***
0.089*
0.029**
0.007**
19,778
-11,841.62***

0.017
0.060
0.114
0.041
0.180
0.166
0.211
< 0.001
<0.001
0.003
<0.001
0.060
0.030
0.043
< 0.001

-0.012

-0.014

0.007

0.006

0.005

0.008
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Table 6: Stock returns around recommendation changes subsequent to large earnings surprises
This table displays the stock returns following analysts’ recommendation changes subsequent to large positive and
large negative earnings surprises, calculated using an event-study methodology. “Event” is defined as a change in
recommendation, and event dates are drawn from the I/B/E/S files. Changes in recommendations comprise upgrades,
downgrades and no-changes (no-changes are not reported in the table). The event window is specified as [-1, +1]. We
accumulate returns from day -1 to capture the effect of a potential earnings information leakage on stock prices (Patell
and Wolfson, 1984). In addition to the raw returns, we use (1) the market model, (2) the market-adjusted model and (3)
the Fama-French 3 factor and momentum model as benchmarks. We report our returns for the affiliated and unaffiliated
analysts separately, in addition to the differences in stock returns for affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. The t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the results of regressing the abnormal stock returns on the analysts’
recommendation changes. The equation is defined as in Equation (4). The dependent variable CAR is defined as
cumulative average abnormal returns measured in a [-1, +1] event window using the market-adjusted model (returns
are converted from digits to percentages by multiplying their values by 100). DRECCHG Dummy variable equal to 1
for an upgrade recommendation for firm i at time t subsequent to earnings surprises in quarter q, and 0 for a downgrade
or reiteration. DDAYS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the earliest recommendation is made within 7 trading days (0
to 6 days) subsequent to the firm’s quarterly earnings announcement, and 0 otherwise. The symbols ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Stock returns following recommendation changes after large earnings surprises
CAR
CAR (market
Raw returns
(market
adjusted model)
model)
Affiliated
4.01%***
3.62%***
3.93%***
(7.70)
(6.35)
(7.39)
Recommendation
changes –
3.47%***
3.15%***
3.34%***
Unaffiliated
upgrade
(9.35)
(6.14)
(6.31)
Large
0.54%*
0.47%
0.59%
positive
Difference
(1.65)
(1.26)
(1.44)
earnings
Affiliated
-1.83%***
-2.24%***
-2.19%***
surprises
(-6.27)
(-9.15)
(-8.75)
Recommendation
changes –
Unaffiliated
-2.40%***
-2.82%***
-2.80%***
downgrade
(-15.24)
(-22.43)
(-22.60)
0.57%
0.58%
0.61%
Difference
(1.58)
(1.49)
(1.52)
Affiliated

Large
negative
earnings
surprises

Recommendation
changes –
upgrade

Unaffiliated
Difference
Affiliated

Recommendation
changes –
downgrade

Unaffiliated
Difference

1.82%***
(4.54)
2.48%***
(10.38)
-0.66%
(-1.61)
-6.83%***
(-7.11)
-5.82%***
(-8.30)
-1.01%*
(-1.88)
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1.36%***
(3.61)
2.02%***
(12.76)
-0.66%
(-1.44)
-6.90%***
(-5.54)
-6.00%***
(-5.24)
-0.90%
(-1.43)

1.93%***
(12.23)
1.72%***
(7.70)
0.21%
(-1.49)
-6.83%***
(-6.30)
-5.42%***
(-7.30)
-1.41%
(-1.38)

CAR (4factor
model)
3.60%***
(8.12)
3.09%***
(8.16)
0.51%
(1.47)
-2.22%***
(-5.00)
-2.72%***
(-12.25)
0.50%
(1.61)
1.71%***
(4.82)
2.17%***
(14.30)
-0.46%
(-1.59)
-6.93%***
(-7.22)
-6.09%***
(-7.10)
-0.84%
(-1.60)

Panel B: Results of regressing abnormal stock returns on analysts’ recommendation changes
Model (1)
Model (2)
Large positive earnings
Large negative earnings
surprise sample
surprise sample
Independent variables
Coefficient
t - statistics
Coefficient
t - statistics
DRECCHG
AFFIL
AFFIL×DRECCHG
SURPRISE
EXP
BRKSZ
LOGMKV
INST
DRECCHG×DDAYS
N
Adjusted R2

0.012***
-0.053
-0.010
0.022***
0.025
0.006**
-0.002
-0.021***
-0.005
25,465
0.09

4.35
-0.91
-1.34
3.05
1.59
2.75
-0.25
-5.42
-1.21
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0.014***
-0.089
0.021
-0.002**
0.018
0.004
-0.001
-0.025***
0.007
15,663
0.10

4.07
-1.48
1.27
-2.27
1.38
0.98
-0.14
-3.47
0.51

Figure 1: Timeline of events – analysts’ recommendations change following large earnings surprises
This figure illustrates the timeline of events examined in the study. We begin by identifying each firm’s
EAD for quarter q from the Compustat quarterly file. We take the most recent recommendation before the
quarter q EAD as the recommendation before the earnings surprise, or RECbefore. This recommendation may
be made either after the firm’s quarter q fiscal period (illustrated by a solid arrow) or during the quarter q
fiscal period (illustrated by a dotted arrow). We choose the latest analyst recommendation. We then take
the very first (or earliest) analyst report (recommendation rating) subsequent to the earnings announcement
for quarter q (RECafter) to examine the changes in the analysts’ recommendations in response to the
earnings surprises reported in quarter q (RECafter – RECbefore). To investigate investors’ reactions to analysts’
earnings revisions and recommendation changes, we examine the abnormal stock returns and trading
volume for 3-day event windows centered on the recommendation changes [-1, +1] using the market model,
the market-adjusted model and the Fama-French 3 factor and momentum model (Carhart, 1997).
Quarter q
fiscal period

Market reactions [-1, +1]

EAD for quarter
Most recent
recommendation before
quarter q EAD, or RECbefore

EAD for quarter

q
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First (earliest)
recommendation or RECafter
subsequent to quarter q EAD
but before q+1 EAD

q+1

Figure 2: Market reactions to stock recommendation changes following large earnings surprises
This figure plots the market reactions (abnormal stock returns and trading volumes) to changes in the
recommendations of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts following large earnings surprises for 41 days [-20,
+20] centered on the recommendation change event date. The CAR values are calculated using the marketadjusted model (CRSP value weighted index). Abnormal volumes are comparison period mean adjusted
volumes, and are determined by subtracting the arithmetic mean volume of the stock of the jth firm
calculated over the estimation period Vˆj from its volume on day t. The estimation period comprises 250
trading days before the event window.
Panel A: Market reactions to affiliated analysts’
recommendation upgrades following large
positive earnings surprises
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Panel C: Market reactions to affiliated analysts’
recommendation downgrades following large
negative earnings surprises
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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Panel B: Market reactions to unaffiliated
analysts’ recommendation upgrades following
large positive earnings surprises

